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Dawn of the Cosmopolitan:
The Hope of a Global Citizens Movement
Orion Kriegman
John Wood
This paper describes global civil society and examines the
potential for what we call movement diplomats to facilitate
a citizens' movement to action beyond today's fragmented
dialogue at the World Social Forum. The paper concludes that
while the emergence of a Global Citizens Movement (GCM)may
not seem probable, we argue it is possible given the historically
unique factors pushing us into a global age. We discuss further
some of the necessary missing ingredients for the emergence
of a GCM and point to future avenues for exploration. Our
work is animated by the prospect of a GCM and we build on
previous literature in this area. We start our discussion with an
examination of the basis for a GCM through the growth of civil
society and the advent of global identity.
Global Civil Society and Latency
The early 19th century campaign spearheaded by religious organizations to end
the slave trade was perhaps the first concerted effort by civil society organizations
to exert influence on global affairs. Since the end of World War II, global civil
society grew at an unprecedented and escalating rate (FIorini, 2000; Kaldor, 2003).
As one indicator of the growth of civil society, we examine the rise of globally
active non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Global NGOs have been steadily
accumulating, and by the 1990s their numbers reached 13,206 active at the global
level, with more added each year (Kaldor, 2003). These global NGOs increasingly
make their voices heard in global forums and negotiations, and many participate
in issue-oriented networks with intergovernmental organizations and the business
sector. Some have viewed the main thrust of this activity as «a world-wide coordination of resistance against the global market" (Hayduk, 2003, p.2S).
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The unprecedented growth and rise in influence of global NGOs may
represent the tip of an iceberg regarding a deep shift in public engagement and
awareness. While part of the rapid increase in global NGOs can be attributed
to the advent of modern information and communication technology, this
alone cannot explain the explosive growth of global activity. Perhaps even
more important is the fact that the very idea of civil society has increasing
legitimacy among the general public in most regions of the world (FIorini,
lOOO) - especially as the post-Co\o11ia\ state and private enterprise have lost
legitimacy. Thus developing countries have experienced the emergence of
vibrant domestic civil society organizations that then provide a foundation
for transnational organizing (Smith, 1998). This is the platform upon which
the globalization of activity could build, tracking the globalization of social,
ecological, and economic challenges over recent decades.
Global NGO activity not only points to a possible latency for a new global
citizen identity, but also contributes to it by articulating the universality of basic
human rights and sustainable development as the basis for a global political
culture (FIorini, 2000). Latency is similar to Ray and Anderson's (2000) notion of
an "emerging culture;' which is a growing trend ofwhat he calls Cultural Creatives
who coalesce into mutual «self-awareness:'
Despite the growing awareness ofthe interrelated nature of today's challenges,
the interests of donors, the dynamics of professional organizations, and certain
ideological orientations tend to favor a narrow issue-oriented approach to the work,
encouraging NGOs to specialize in delineated niches, "issue silos;' or what Harvey
(1996) calls "militant particularisms" (p.34). The strength of global civil society
remains circumscribed by this organizational and philosophical fragmentation.
Additionally, success stories of community action, often inspiring in terms of
local accomplishments, have not been able to scale up to new pathways for global
development. Today's civil society efforts remain too dispersed, diffused, and
small scale to systematically transform the dominant trends of globalization led
by powerful state actors and multinational corporations (Raskin et aI., 2002).
Still, the rapid growth of civil society is a profound source of hope if it
represents an early manifestation of a widespread latent desire among concerned
citizens who recognize that the world must address a suite of deepening social,
economic, and environmental problems, but do not yet know how to take action
themselves. This hypothesis-positing such a latent desire to be engaged in
shaping global society-is further strengthened by an examination of the novel
conditions defining this planetary phase of history.
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Planetary Phase of History: Support for the latency hypothesis

e formation of the UN, ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human
.ghts and the Geneva Accords among other landmark treaties, and development
f institutions such as the International Criminal Court, the International
onetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO)
xpress the growing need to develop new forms of cooperation at the global
level. Yet the tantalizing promises of improved global relations, new technologies
ringing widespread prosperity, and rational management of the earth's resources
eem to dangle just out of reach.
Since the 1960s, ubiquitous images of our fragile planet floating in the
astness of space have changed our consciousness-making us more cognizant of
humanity's vulnerability and interconnectedness (Giddens, 2000; Scholte, 2000).
Technologies such as airplanes, T~ satellites, and the Internet have expanded
awareness of cultures and events across the world. We are now instantly aware
of havoc wrought by hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, genocide, poverty, and
IDS. Displaced by such tragic events, or simply seeking better opportunities,
increasing numbers of migrants test the hospitality of wealthy, relatively
homogenous communities. As economies become more interconnected and the
rate of cultural exchange increases, for better or worse, our world is shrinking.
Pursuing business as usual in this rapidly shrinking world is increasingly
difficult, not least because the planet's climate is becoming less predictable, with
the catastrophic consequences ofgreenhouse gas accumulation becoming bleaker
and more evident daily (Speth, 2005). In addition to global warming, we are faced
with other unparalleled environmental challenges, such as cross-boundary water
degradation and air pollution, overfishing, declining ecosystems, and loss of
biodiversity. The threats to our collective existence are quite real. Ecocide, nuclear
proliferation, global terror networks, new military technologies, and the threat
of pandemics remind us, as Bertrand Russell once said, «it's coexistence or no
existence" (Locke, 1962: 694). Only greater degrees of international cooperation
can possibly resolve these complex dilemmas.
People's psychological responses to a shrinking world include some mixture
of fear and hope. When fear dominates, this can lead to xenophobia, retreating
into protected enclaves, and projecting militaristic solutions (Rothman, 1992).
It can also fuel fundamentalist movements that offer reassurance and simple
answers for an increasingly perplexing world. When hope is strong, people's
highest aspirations motivate them to uphold their moral responsibilities to
their fellow humans and the larger community of life. Countless new cultural
developments manifest the growing awareness that one's narrow self-interest is
dependent on general social and ecological interests (Ray & Anderson, 2000).
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In contrast to fundamentalism, many religious leaders now seek to emphasize
the great humanitarian traditions of their faiths and the theological basis for
tolerance and cooperation.
In developing countries this hope is expressed by communities devising
new development paradigms seeking sustainable livelihoods (Amalric, 2004).
Indigenous groups, women's place-based initiatives, worker-owned cooperatives,
and community lending institutions all enhance local empowerment. La Via
Campesina, for example, is a 56 country movement coalition with the expressed
goal to unite small farmer organizations to promote social justice and gender
equality in fair economic relations as well as the preservation of land, water,
seeds, and other natural resources. This non-western movement also focuses
food sovereignty and sustainable agricultural production.
In relation to peasant struggles, Via Campensina who has
managed to bring together the most active peasant organizations,
basically in Latin America, is extremely influential much more
than Western NGOs. Via Campesina has recently built ties with
peasant organization in countries as far different as in West
Africa, Southern Africa, India and even China (Amin, 2008).
In wealthier countries, these insights manifest in various lifestyle movements
(e.g., voluntary simplicity, slow foods, cooperatives, eco-villages) seeking to
consume less and devote more time to family, community, and personal projects
(Degraaf, et al., 1995). The hope of improved lives in a just and caring world
is the most empowering psychological response to the turbulence of our times.
The Internet has facilitated intercommunication about the Zapatistas' plight in
Chiapas, which also influenced protests in Seattle that set off the intense, yet brief
interaction between activists in different movements, each with different goals,
strategies, and visions (Wood 2008). The increased interaction ofactivists through
the Internet, protests, and social forums has intensified both intercommunications
as well as the potential capacity to influence future movement activity, especially
as globalization processes intensify.
These objective and subjective conditions emerging in this planetary phase
of civilization underpin the latency hypothesis, that more and more people are
inclined to understand themselves as part of a common community of fate that
includes all of humanity and the biosphere (Raskin, 2006a). This transformation
of consciousness challenges conventional categories of identity. The key to the
political crystallization of today's cultural latency is the shift toward a shared
identity-the co-recognition and internalization of others' struggles as our own
in a global community of fate, Le. the dawn of the cosmopolitan.
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Cosmopolitan Identity
The identification of oneself as part of the human family, with responsibility for
one's brothers and sisters, is an extension of the sense ofkinship many already feel
for their nation, hometown, and family. Political theorists discussing the sense
of belonging and responsibility to an "imagined community" (Anderson, 1991)
have introduced the. concept of an implicit social contract that characterizes
the presumed rights and obligations of individuals to the community, and of
the community to individuals. This implied citizenship can precede explicit
constitutional and institutional manifestation.
The emergence of a global identity is a new implicit social contract in which
increasing numbers ofpeople understand themselves practically and aspirationally
as global citizens (Dower, 2007). Carter (2001) locates the emergence of global
citizenship within an emergent transnational civil society. Global citizens, she
argues, are transnational social movement activists who are committed to ((social
justice, diversity, sustainable economic development respecting the environment
and to a peaceful world" (p. 98). These global citizens share the broad values and
principles that would underlie a transition to a just and sustainable planetary
ociety. This new global identity need not subsume or eliminate particular
ubglobal or group identities, although it would certainly transform them.
Identity, like personality, is quite complex and hard to delineate as different
aspects of it are evoked under varying social and political pressures (Stryker,
2000). People can simultaneously identify with their local sports team, their
undergraduate alma mater, their gender, their religion, their ethnic group,
their generation, etc. Humans are not reducible to either the universal or the
particular-we are dynamically multi-dimensional (Wood, 2005). In the United
States, the fluidity of identity is often observed. After centuries of migration,
many people hyphenate their identities: African-American, Italian-American,
Jewish-American, Indian-American, etc. Some might feel most loyal to their
hometown, then their state, then their geographic region, and finally identify as
American; while others might see themselves primarily as American, not invested
in any specific locale. Recently, due to popularization by the mass media, some
Americans identify as part of the Democratic "blue-states" or Republican ((redtates;' illustrating how quickly identity can be constructed and deconstructed.
While the assertion that we choose our identities is an oversimplification, it is
clear that personal identity is influenced by collective human choices in relation
to external factors. The question then is: under what circumstances might the
identity of global citizen emerge?
People have identified themselves as "citizens of the world" at least as
far back as the Stoic philosophers in the Roman Empire who argued that
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all humanity belongs to a single moral community (Cooper & Procops,
1995). The Stoics have their roots in the Greek Cynics of the fourth century
B.C. who coined the term "cosmopolitan" meaning "citizen of the cosmos."
Today, to embrace an identity as a cosmopolitan, one can continue to take
pride in one's local, regional, or ethnic culture and community-but add a
healthy respect for other cultures in the context of pride for the diversity of
human achievement.
What does need to be abandoned is any fundamentalist notion that all
of humanity must conform to a single cultural expression-no longer can we
afford to tolerate chauvinist pretensions. The reification of cultural archetypes
ignores the fact that culture itself is always fluid and evolving, and that
human societies have continuously traded ideas, cuisine, music, etc., while
absorbing, blending, and innovating (Appiah, 2006). Cosmopolitanism rejects
chauvinism and values diverse cultures, regarding all people of the earth as
branches of a single family tree. The diffusion of this old consciousness in the
new context of globalization is the basis for forging global citizenship.
Lest this sound too utopian, let's remember that the extension of identity
has historical precedent in the enlargement of society from clans to tribes to
chiefdoms to city-states to nation -states. At one point the crystallization of
national identities seemed as implausible as global identity might seem today,
and yet, with hindsight, the formation of nation-states appears natural, almost
inevitable (Raskin, 2006a). More recently, we can observe social and political
forces attempting to construct identity around multinational regions. But, as the
struggle over the European Union constitution shows us, identity realignment
is a nonlinear process that must overcome historically rooted inertia (Klitou,
2005). As identities enlarge, so do the existential fears that what one cherishes
may be dissolved. Today, powerful conservative elements are mobilized to
resist the loss of autonomy to broader decision-making communities that
include people of other cultures, languages, and histories. Such fears should
not be dismissed as mere xenophobia. The historical expansion of identity is a
process riddled with wars, genocides, and subjugation. Threats to the identities
of peoples, certainly in past times, have been quite deadly.
In fact, the threat of an external foe has often been a significant part of the
impetus to overcome regional antagonisms and forge new bonds of cooperation
(e.g., the Greek city-states vis-a-vis the Persian Empire) (Staggenborg, 1986).
Moreover, a common enemy was the focus at the Seattle protest, where activists
framed the WTO as the main target of their opposition. Benjamin (2000) argues:
"The violence of the World Trade Organization and its corporate beneficiaries
are our true opponents" (p. 72). Ideology, myths, and religion often serve as the
tools to weave people together in the context of common defense or conquest.
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Yet) for robust new identities to cohere) in addition to external threats there
must be the internal motivation of a shared dream of people-hood.
For example) it has been argued that the novel, a relatively new art form that
offered a narrative story written in vernacular) played an instrumental role in
helping construct the imagined community of the Italian nation-state) which had
to overcome strong antagonisms between city-states (Anderson) 1991). The novel
helped inspire people to conceive of themselves as part of a common cultural
group. While other factors such as leadership and the role of elites were essential,
the novel seeded the cultural moment) or latency) for national identity.
Thus) the push of necessity (external threat) and the pull of desire (internal
motivation) are· both critical in the construction of identity. In retrospect) the
specific boundaries framing national identities are somewhat arbitrary) while the
case for global identity is more objective: we all share one world. Many people) from
the Stoics onward) have noted this. While past movements for world citizenship
were premature) the objective and subjective conditions shaping the planetary
phase create conditions that are ripe for the emergence of global citizens.
Ofcourse) this latent inclination among an increasing number ofpeople to see
themselves as part of a common community of fate cannot be directly observed
since) by definition) it is yet to manifest. It is a multi-layered phenomenon
with many cultural currents just under the surface that occasionally bubble up
as movies) books) lectures) songs) websites) study groups) new organizations)
protests) or other modes of expression. As these signifiers of new identity become
more noticeable) they feed back and amplify) stimulating reflection and action on
the part of others) bringing the latency in the system closer to the surface. New
information technologies accelerate this process.
We argue that it is in the latency hypothesis that we find the potential for
the emergence of a historically novel phenomenon: a Global Citizens Movement
(GCM). In contrast to the existing fragmented global movements) a GCM implies
a framework for common action that moves beyond reactive protest to the
proactive implementation of a hopeful vision - this is discussed further below.
Although it would emerge from the inchoate pool of latency) in its robust form
a GCM would be a coherent movement of a significant segment of the world
population. Such a movement would emerge in opposition to mainstream notions
of development and the meaning of "the good life;) and would provide plausible
alternative visions. A movement that engaged ordinary citizens throughout the
world) as it expanded and matured) would eventually connect with sympathetic
partners in political parties) governments) corporations) even the military. Thus)
a GCM would be distinct from) but engaged with) other major global actors.
To be clear) we do not accept the notion that a GCM would spontaneously selforganize once a critical mass ofcivil society activity is reached. Such convenient fatalism
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downplays the need for intentional leadership. A GCM is not a foregone conclusion,
or even a probable outcome.· Stipulating the latency hypothesis, the pertinent question
becomes: how could cultural latency crystallize into a robust GCM?
Hope is a crucial missing ingredient. Increasingly, the general public is aware
of emerging dangers but, in the absence of compelling alternative visions and a
clear way to take action, apprehension can lead to apathy and resignation. Should
the de-stabilizing tensions in the emerging global system ultimately lead to some
form of global crisis, people well could embrace authoritarian solutions out of
desperation and retreat into national enclaves. Fear without hope is not a powerful
basis for social change. The development of a plausible vision that reflects our
highest aspirations while respecting local differences and the diversity of human
culture would provide a basis for hope. The diffusion of such a hopeful vision
prior to a global crisis could make the crystallization of a GeM possible.

Today's Global Justice Movement
The broad umbrella term ((Global Justice Movement"refers here to many different
movements seeking to find areas of overlap and common agreement.
This "movement" developed from a series ofobscure transnational campaigns
led by NGOs organizing protests and counter-summits against global financial
institutions (WTO, IMF, World Bank) and neo-liberal trade negotiations
throughout the 1990s (Hawken, 2000). Major UN-sponsored conferences during
this decade brought feminists, human rights activists, environmentalists, and
many other groups from the global North into contact with their counterparts
from the global South. Activists in the Global Justice Movement seek to link
Northern solidarity movements with myriad struggles for sustainable livelihood
and self-determination in the global South. A common thread connecting these
groups is a shared critique of the dominance of neo-liberal economic doctrines
shaping globalization (Brooks, 2004; Callahan, 2004).
The 1999 protest that shut down the WTO meeting in Seattle marked a
turning point-for the first time, blue-collar workers, farm workers, consumers,
envirOlimentalists, churches, feminists, pacifists, and human rights associations
joined to address policy making at the global level (Hawken, 2000; Welton et aI.,
2001). The protest in Seattle was followed by a series oflarge demonstrations at major
international meetings through 2003. A globally coordinated wave ofprotests against
the threat of war in Iraq culminated in an international protest with approximately
ten million people in 60 countries on 15 February, 2003 (Guinness Book of World
Records, 2004). While large transnational grassroots protests continue to shape
negotiations around the WTO and other proposed trade agreements (such as the
FTAA), they have not captured the same attention from the global media since the
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US-led invasion of Iraq. The emergence of the ((Global War on Terror;' ongoing
conflict in the Middle East) and other geo-political developments (such as left-ofcenter political victories in Latin America) continue to influence the character and
strategies of this maturing movement (della Porta) 2005).
Ofparticular note is the World Social Forum (WSF) first held in 2001 in Porto
Alegre) Brazil) on the same dates as the World Economic Forum (Lewis) 2001;
Bello) 2003). Convening a wide range of activists and NGOs from civil society in
the global North and South) the WSF has grown from about 16)000 participants
in 2001 to 155)000 in 2005 (with a smaller number in 2007) (della Porta) 2005).
In 2006) in order to increase accessibility and worldwide participation) the WSF
adopted.a ((polycentric" approach with meetings in Bamako) Caracas) and Karachi.
In addition) local and regional forums have been held in Africa) the Middle East,
Asia) Europe) Latin America) and the United States. These global and regional
forums express the desire among activists in different movements to overcome
fragmentation and create linkages between their various campaigns. However)
also visible are ((continuous divisions between activists of the global North and the
South) as well as (old left' and New Social Movements (NSMs) visions of the world)
[that] are reflected in only temporary) and turbulent) alliances" (della Porta) 2005).

Limits ofExisting Movements and WSF
Despite the potential to build on natural synergies) existing movements are
severely limited by current political realities; i.e., the process of building practical
linkages between multiple actors requires continuous negotiation and dialogue.
Among social movements seeking to ally in the Global Justice Movement-e.g.,
indigenous) feminist) labor) peasant) human rights) environmental, socialist) etc.it is difficult to move beyond reactive protest and articulate a common proactive
agenda. Issues) priorities) and even goals often conflict. For example) feminism is
fundamentally devoted to modernizing gender relations) while many indigenous
groups and religious formations revere patriarchal traditions (Harcourt) 2006).
Furthermore) even among groups that share priorities) they can differ over
the strategies and tactics endorsed. The need to overcome fragmentation and
cohere as a movement capable of offering credible alternatives is hampered by
organizational turf wars) competing personalities) different languages) racism,
conflicting goals) and divergent priorities.
We argue that the success of the WSF in convening large numbers of
individuals and delegates from existing movements throughout the world is a step
toward increasing coherence) and demonstrates the desire for interaction among
a wide range of activists. The great strength of the WSF has been its commitment
to maintaining itself as a forum) refusing to articulate an official platform or
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resolutions that would endorse specific policy recommendations (WSF, 2004) thus, limiting the gathering for the exchange of ideas and information - allowing
the broadest range of social movements to participate.
Yet, this process is slow and flawed (Larson, 2006; Waterman, 2005).
Sophisticated dialogue is the hard work necessary to reframe movements out
of particular issue-silos into a common systemic effort. However, the leadership
of the WSF-mired in ideological divides and factional power struggles that
mirror the philosophical debates engulfing the movement as a whole-has
been unable to devise a process that facilitates real dialogue and engagement
of competing tensions among WSF attendees. This problem is exacerbated by
rhetoric describing the WSF as a "leaderless self-organizing" event which further
obscures reality and undermines clear communication over the challenges facing
the WSF (Waterman, 2005).
At the sub-national level, for community-based groups seeking sustainable
livelihoods and new modes of development, the challenge of building linkages is
closely related to the challenge of expansion and the need to scale-up nationally
(Amalric, 2004). For example, the empowerment oflocal actors has yet to translate
into electoral power in countries like India or South Africa. Conversely, while on
a global stage transnational protests are making a mark, nationally many of the
most active groups have limited visibility and political influence.
The expansion of social movements is constrained by the active opposition of
entrenched powers, limited access to media and resources, and the extension of
a globalizing consumer culture that fosters cynicism and resignation. Of course,
these political realities vary from country to country and throughout regions of
the world. For example, widespread social movements in Bolivia and Venezuela
have led to changes in political power. Still, in both these countries, environmental
concerns and the rights of indigenous communities are subordinated to the need
to address poverty through economic growth and job creation.
A telling question is: Should a global crisis strike tomorrow, would the existing
cacophony ofsocial movements be able to adequately channel the erupting energy
towards positive solutions? We argue that the turbulence of crisis would likely
further weaken existing movements and scatter new energies, thus while today's
fragmented movements continue to evolve they do not add up to a GCM.

Lessons for a GeM
The ends of a just and equitable world filled with cultural diversity and freedoms
must be alive in the means the movement utilizes to organize itself. Building a
united movement requires overcoming massive barriers of regional antagonisms,
ideological conflict, and organizational turfbattles (Zald & McCarthy 1987). Such
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a movement needs a «politics of trust;) balancing a commitment to both pluralism
and coherence, seeking common ground despite differences (GTI Proposal, 2003).
McAdam (1982) would contend that a diverse coalition can apply pressure on the
opposition from many fronts. This diversity of allies also indicates a potentially
nurturing place to learn and engage with others who are different (Warkentin,
2001) - and would thus help the movement embody the ends it seeks.
The creation of a politics of trust requires transcending polarities that
constrain the potential for effective action. People often construct a narrative of
tark binary choices in order to emphasize a point, call attention to a problematic
ituation, and provoke others into choosing sides. However, such polarized debate
an limit the generation of creative solutions. We find that the most problematic
olarizations for a politics of trust revolve around the question: can we find a
egitimate means to balance the commitment to both diversity and coherence?
This question is not new (e.g., earlier scholars, such as Diani (1992) and Melucci
1996), have asked academics and activists to explore the same question).
Proponents of diversity decry homogenization and emphasize that political
nd cultural diversity is a strength, just as biodiversity maintains the health and
esilience ofecosystems. Conversely, advocates for unity decry fragmentation and
Insist that unity is necessary for effective action that can scale-up to effectively
rallenge entrenched powers and the direction of global development. Thus)
binary choice is presented between (a) a homogenized unification with the
anger of authoritarian suffocation or (b) a fragmented diversity with the risk of a
acophony of ineffective voices. Obviously, as framed, neither option is desirable.
hile it is easy to say a GeM needs both the strength of unity and the strength of
iversity, it is important to understand why these concerns are historically pitted
gainst each other.
The New Social Movements (NSMs) that emerged in the 1970s and (80s celebrate
((plurality of resistances, each of them a special case" (Foucault, 1980). The French
hilosopher, Michel Foucault, problematizing traditional notions ofpower, explained
at everyone has power over someone else and therefore a unified struggle for social
ransformation would result in replicating oppression, silencing deviant minorities
r the sake of ((victory:) In this vein, NSMs criticize the ((old left" for attempting to
bsume all efforts under the single banner of class struggle, without concern for the
ultipllcity of issues involving gender, race, or the environment.
Fear of tyranny of the majority and oppressive hierarchies dominates NSM
rategies (Melucci, 1989; Best & Kellner, 1991). There is an ongoing debate
out the role of leadership versus faith in ((spontaneous self-organization:)
adership implies an organizational hierarchy that can be anti-egalitarian and
.mit the autonomy of factions within an organized structure-an oft-cited cause
the collapse of the bureaucratized socialist parties of the old left (Rowbotham
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et aI., 1980). Many of today's activists argue we are moving into an era where
self-organizing networks of relatively independent, loosely connected actors
will be increasingly important (Wood, 2005). While this claim has been around
since the 1960s, recent examples abound, from the Internet (blogosphere, open
source movement), to protests (1999 Battle of Seattle, Critical Mass bike rides),
to the activity at the World Social Forum. However, others note that this rhetoric
generally obscures very real mechanisms of authority, and a lack of transparency
reduces accountability (Waterman, 2005). Ironically, for some, the anti-leadership
orientation has become yet another ideological rigidity.
An antecedent of the contemporary call for unity around a shared vision is
the writing of Antonio Gramsci, an Italian social theorist jailed in the 1930s for
his anti-fascist organizing, who critiqued the fatalism of Marxists who believed in
the inevitability of socialist revolution. Gramsci argued that the capitalist system
did not maintain its dominance simply through economic power and coercion,
but that it also manufactured ideological and cultural consent (Gramsci, 1971).
While Gramsci underscored the importance of a shared identity and vision in
social transformation, he did not believe this could be authentically articulated by
top-down leadership, but rather would have to be articulated by those immersed
in the social conditions being contested.
There is no one rallying point (e.g., climate change, poverty, imperialism,
justice, etc.) that will galvanize a GCM-as Foucault warned, all other struggles
should not be subordinated to a superordinate cause. Still, the problems we face
are interconnected and cannot be solved in a piecemeal fashion. Those fighting
for human rights, and those fighting for ecosystem protections, those seeking
to forestall global warming, and those struggling to escape from poverty must
all recognize that they are addressing different aspects of a unitary challenge of
building a" just and sustainable global future and their success is interdependent
and requires a systemic shift (Albert et aI., 1986). It is important to understand
how each effort is part of a larger framework for analysis and action.
A shared framework need not be thought of as a static blueprint created
by elite leadership. Instead, an effective and legitimate framework would
need to be iteratively articulated through a dynamic process of dialogue
rooted in the diverse experiences of participants. An effective process would
require transparent and accountable leadership to facilitate the involvement
of diverse peoples, and ensure the participation of historically marginalized
voices. Instead of pretending there are no leaders, or no need for them, it
is important to acknowledge that what it means to exercise leadership is
evolving. The models of steep hierarchy and command-and-control are
increasingly questioned even in the business sector and some aspects of the
military (Hock, 1999).
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Increasingly) scholars distinguish the act ofleadership from the role ofauthority
(Heifetz) 1994; Williams) 2005). Authority figures are authorized by constituencies
that put them in power to carry out certain functions) and in doing so they may) or
may not) exercise real leadership. Real leaders are those who empower and inspire
groups to engage unpleasant realities) work through conflicts) and generate new
insights that increase effectiveness-regardless of what rank they may hold. Thus)
although George W. Bush is in a role of authority as President) when it comes to
preparing the United States to face the unpleasant reality of climate change) he
responds to the demands of his constituency (i.e.) the oil lobby) and fails to exercise
leadership. Leadership scholars emphasize that it is rare for authority figures to act
courageously) and even rarer for them to purposefully disappoint their constituents'
demands) as their primary focus is on gaining and maintaining their position
(Heifetz) 1994). Real leadership-in the sense of mobilizing people and groups to
deal with problematic realities on behalf of improving the human condition and
generating progress-is needed at every level of every organization) and from the
local to global level of action (Williams) 2005).
In sum) a worldwide movement of global citizens will need to draw strength
from both diversity and unity. The latency hypothesis posits that the potential for
the emergence of cosmopolitan identity is present in the historic moment. The
upsurge of civil society activity) in the form ofNGOs and social movements) over
the past few decades can be understood as an early manifestation of the latency
in the global system) and at the same time this transnational activity helps deepen
the latency. However) the existing Global Justice Movement remains fragmented
and has yet to provide a plausible alternative vision that can be widely shared.
Without a shared pro-active framework) it is hard to imagine how the latent
potential would coalesce into a GCM. The development of a shared vision will
depend on new forms of leadership to facilitate engaged dialogue inclusive of
diverse voices.

Contours of a Global Citizens Movement
s we have shown) there already are many groups taking action on a wide range
of issues. If a GCM were to coalesce) existing activity would be amplified as new
groups emerged-thus the challenge facing a GeM is not promoting action per
e) but increasing the strategic impact of action as part of a common project. This
means the critical need is for dialogue) analysis) and visioning. Without clarity of
vision) tapping into the latent potential of the concerned but currently inactive
citizens) and thus mobilizing the requisite numbers of people for a truly global
movement) will not be possible. Many of the people in our lives are in this boat:
they would love to be a part of a movement if they could find one they could
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believe in. Instead, they see cacophonous efforts that don't seem to be building in
strategic fashion toward plausible solutions.
In its early phases a GCM can perhaps be thought ofas a seed crystal, containing
within the means it uses to organize itself the ends of a just and sustainable world.
Organizing this seed crystal prior to any emerging global crisis increases the
likelihood that, should crisis strike, the vision of the GCM could spread rapidly to
inspire humanity's efforts toward renewal and hope (Raskin, 2006a).
A sustainable world is one of biodiversity and diverse, healthy ecosystems.
Likewise, a just world is one of human liberation) filled with cultural diversity and
creative expression and exploration. Thus the means by which a GCM is organized
must honor the diversity ofvoices that give rise to its creation. The tension between
unity and plurality, like many of the paradoxes in life) is not to be overcome;
instead we argue a GCM must somehow hold both truths simultaneously. This
inherent tension between unity and plurality always persists-indeed it is the
cause of political struggle in all communities. Thus a GCM will have internal
conflicts and will contain its own politics. Bounded by the container of a shared
vision of a just and sustainable world, conflicts can be engaged through a politics
of trust-Le., «a collective commitment ... emphasizing a predisposition toward
seeking common ground and tolerating proximate differences in order to nurture
the ultimate basis for solidarity" (GTI Proposal, 2003).
Creating an expedient unity-through majority rule or authoritarian
leadership-is a form of tyranny counter to the vision of justice that would
animate the GCM. Rather then replicating domination, we argue that a GCM must
seek to create mechanisms for authentic partnership and cooperation between
equals. This will require clear shared first principles that protect the rights of
minority and deviant voices. Identifying these principles creates a framework for
justice claims to be negotiated and conflicts to be resolved. Similarly) informal,
unspecified power structures have a tendency to be dominated by cliques and
remain unaccountable) potentially corrupting into their own form of tyranny.
Rather than denying the value of authority and leadership) explicit, transparent
power structures are needed to hold authority figures accountable and promote
active leadership at all levels.
With the above lessons in mind) we can assert that in addition to a wide-range
of ongoing activity with its diverse tactics) campaigns) and actions at local and
global scales) an authentic GCM needs a shared vision emerging from a process
of engaged dialogue effectively coordinated through new forms of leadership.
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Constructing a Shared Vision
shared vision would naturally rest on principles that were forged through
centuries of struggle and are the heritage of all humanity: freedom) equity)
democracy) and sustainability. Articulated in the UN Declaration of Human
Rights) Agenda 21) the Earth Charter) and scores of other documents) these
principles provide a framework for further discussions on how to realize them in
practice. 18 The ethical foundations would be based on individual and collective
responsibility for the well-being of others) the wider community oflife) and future
generations. The value foundations would be ((quality of life) human solidarity)
and ecological sensibility.... A culture of peace) reconciliation) and non-violence
ould infuse the new global movement" (GTI Proposal, 2003).
The iterative articulation of a shared vision would rest in a process of engaged
dialogue. Engaged dialogue differs from mere tolerance. Tolerance could be said
o be the basis of the WSF) allowing diverse and contentious groups to attend
he same forum without ever engaging the source of their difference. Engaged
dialogue requires that key conflicts are not avoided) but are approached with
killed facilitation and a commitment to a politics of trust) so they do not become
o disruptive as to cause disengagement. Constructively engaging conflict
requires that all parties are open to transforming their identities in relation to
new learning. In successful dialogue process) disputants learn to express their
own voices (empowerment) and hear one another (recognition) (Bush & Folger)
1994). Identity is reframed from ((I" to ((we" as shared values and concerns are
recognized (Rothman) 1997).
The WSF demonstrates the potential to convene a large number of actors to a
pace of pseudo-dialogue) but we argue it fails to generate the level of engagement
necessary for a reframing of identity. An authentic GCM would have spaces in
hich conflicts are surfaced and relationships are transformed and strengthened
hrough dialogue. Thus) a GCM would not be free from dissent and internal
politics) but rather would express a new form of politics bounded by shared
alues and principles. In fact) a movement that embodied diversity engaged in
onstructive dialogue would carry within it the seed of a new global governance
ystem. Modeling such engagement would also create a plausible basis for hope
and attract many more participants.
ew forms ofleadership
Rather than understanding the GCM as a single organization (e.g.) as a global
political party)) we should bear in mind that) historically) social movements are
composed of multiple) even competing) organizations. What binds a GCM is a
hared vision of global citizenship and a life-affirming planetary civilization) not
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a single organizational structure. A GCM would grow through widening circles
of participation and dialogue as increasing numbers of citizens self-identify as
part of a common movement.
A specific type of leadership, we argue, is required that would have the
authority and resources to convene and maintain the dialogues for developing
shared visions and perspectives. A GeM requires a new form of leadershipmovement diplomats-that would complement civil society's paid staff,
charismatic visionaries, influential philanthropists, community organizers,
and organizational heads. Trained and supported directly by organizations
or communities, these diplomats would be charged with the task of building
systemic coalitions, bridging diverse movement cultures. These diplomats would
seek to translate the rhetoric of different factions, foster communication, and
find common ground. We envision that they would provoke learning in their
own organizations, challenging sacred cows and calling attention to problematic
realities, as part of the job of bridging diverse movement cultures. This difficult
work is ongoing and leads to the transformation of identities as new realities
are integrated into the work of organizations and communities. Ideally, this new
evolution in leadership would include core competencies of facilitation, strategic
dialogue, systems thinking, and familiarity with the scientific requirements for
an ecologically sustainable world. This new role of leadership would not replace
other necessary types' of leadership, but would complement them in helping to
maintain the balance between coherence and diversity within a GCM.
This difficult work of diplomacy, often unglamorous and contentious, could
become a highly respected and influential form of leadership. If such roles are
given recognition and support, a network of movement diplomats and diplomatic
training programs could help a systemic movement overcome barriers oflanguage,
class, region, and outdated «issue-silos:' It would be through the work of these
diplomats that spaces for engaged dialogue would be developed, multiplied, and
enhanced. Movement diplomats could be a key to developing coherence while
avoiding the evolution of stultifying movement hierarchies.
Sharing an identity and constructing a vision through multiple spaces of
engaged dialogue, the GCM would be an «ecosystem" of organizations, networks,
and individuals all occupying the «niche" of sustainability and justice. This
essential «biodiversity" of the movement encompasses a world with diverse
cultures, regions, and modes of life. The diagram below suggests the relationships
between elements of this ecosystem. The arrows represent the work of the
movement diplomats in building and maintaining relationships, and translating
lessons from one level to another.
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Organizations
Groups
Individuals

Figure 1: Ecosystem of a Global Citizens Movelnent

The upper left of the figure depicts the diverse organizations and informal
roups that will continue to be active at local, regional, or global levels. This
ould include political parties, faith-based communities, and NGOs engaged in
ampaigns, protests, and construction of positive alternatives. Individuals would
in the GCM by linking to existing groups or creating new ones. Taking advantage
increasingly high-powered information and communication technology, many
cal, regional, and global networks (illustrated by the overlapping circles) would
ntinue to form on a range of themes. Importantly, those organizations with
ansparent, accountable lines of decision-making authority might more easily
rge linkages among plural actors.
In the middle of the image, regional councils governed by transparent and
ountable leadership structures and funded by constituent organizations could
open to all who agree to the ground rules necessary to generate engaged
logue. Scenario building methods could be used to develop consensus around
ional visions. Delegates from community groups and organizations could
organized into discussion groups with a full range of diversity (class, gender,
nicity, age, etc.) to engage in dialogue with the help of trained facilitators.
results would be synthesized, debated, refined, and taken back to constituent
ups for input and improvement. Councils would reconvene annually to repeat
process as conditions evolve.
The goal of this process would be to produce a broad consensus that was
ed in sophisticated analysis that rigorously weighed various options, guided
e values underlying the GCM. Different regional councils could develop their
cultures and might differ in their decision-making practices; importance
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would be placed on the engagement and dialogue across sectors and issues. These
councils would be the operational hub of a GCM) and would have trained staff
skilled in dialogue and facilitation) scenario development) and diplomacy.
To coordinate issues of global concern, regional councils would need to select
regional representatives for a global counciL In an authentic GCM, the formation of
a global council would be guided by the same principles that define the movement .
(e.g., equity) democracy) freedom, sustainability) reconciliation, nonviolence, etc.).
Elected representatives would be held accountable and could be removed from
office. However, elections that are decided on majority votes could perpetuate the
historic marginalization of minority voices. Each regional council would have to
engage these concerns, and solutions might vary (some might choose to guarantee
slots to indigenous communities, women) and other historically marginalized
groups). The power of the global council within the GCM as a whole would reside
in the wisdom of its suggestions and whatever resources it could direct toward
these ideas. As a body representative of the regional councils) it would have the
moral authority to speak to the press) governments) and corporations on behalf of
a growing global movement. As the GCM matured) this global council could offer
clues for the establishment of a global citizens) parliament.
While the communities) organizations) and institutions inhabited by global
citizens would use a range of democratic decision-making structures, from
representative democracy to consensus, the dominant ethic in all these endeavors
would be to seek first to understand, then to be understood. This new mood of
discourse and listening could allow the movement to transcend the stale dichotomy
of highly centralized decision-making versus uncoordinated, weak alliances.

Conclusion
While more thinking is needed about the relationship between latency) vision)
and sociall1l0Vements, it does seem possible that a positive feedback loop could
be established. A vision that convincingly describes a hopeful image of the future
and a plausible pathway for getting there could inspire more people to believe
in the possibility of a sustainable planetary civilization and) thus, to take up the
challenge of global citizenship. Strategic campaigns initiated by widening circles
of activists in concert with this vision would) in turn, allow more impressive
victories to occur, inspiring yet more people, and so on. The combination of a
shared vision with clear victories expands the frontiers of the possible-hope is
contagious and change happens quickly. As substantive gains are made and the
lives of the poor improve, the solidarity of the peoples of the world deepens, and
a new sense of identity as global citizens takes hold.
A GCM must be able to contest power and shape the global future-without
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this there is no ((movement;) just a lot of chaotic activity. A shared vision needs
to embrace ((plural solutions»-alternative local and regional approaches that are
ompatible with global responsibilities and citizenship. Thus) a GCM will have
different local and regional expressions) but share similar values. Leadership will
be essential at all levels to help educate) coordinate, facilitate, and motivate. Such
a process can only be built in stages, and each stage would mobilize more citizens
and revise organizational structures and processes.
This movement would draw its energy from multiple sources. Certainly, local
onditions and the struggle against direct oppression would be central. But more,
. would be animated by concern with the well-being of the whole human family,
ith the fate of future generations, and with the sustainability of the broader web
f life. Such a shift in consciousness toward a capacious cosmopolitan identity is
historic potential resonant with the objective conditions of deepening global
nnectivity. This is the hope of a Global Citizens Movement.

pendix 1
A Typology of Global Civil Society Activity for Justice and Sustainability
Type

Description

Examples

Global Forums

Civil society meets to share
ideas, discuss experiences,
and build community.

World Social Forum, NGO
meetings accompanying
major international
summits (e.g., annual UN
Framework Convention on
Climate Change, etc.)

Various initiatives enhance
connectivity by providing
information resources for
civil society organizations
and the wider public.

Inter Press Service,
Sustainable Development
Communications Network,
Social Watch, Coalition for
the International Criminal
Court, Indymedia, etc.

Analysts from policy
institutes and academia
build the knowledge
base for sustainable
development and influence
policy.

The Ring, Third World
Network, Trade Knowledge
Network, Trans National
Institute, Transnational
Foundation for Peace
and Future Research,
International Forum on
Globalization, Focus on the
Global South, etc.

ews and Information

Research Networks
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A Typology of Global Civil Society Activity for Justice and Sustainability
Type

Description

Examples

Humanitarian and
Development Aid

Organizations respond
to natural disasters,
genocides, famines,
deforestation, extreme
poverty, etc.

Oxfam, CARE, World Vision,
Medecins Sans Frontieres,
Red Cross and Crescent,
Catholic Relief Services,
World Wildlife Fund, etc.

Global Campaigns
and Protests

Coalitions address ongoing
international policy
debates, environmental
and human rights issues,
or mobilize action around
specific events linking local
place-based struggles to
transnational networks.

Climate Action Network,
ATTAC (Association pour la
Taxation des Transactions
pour l'Aide aux Citoyens),
Global Forest Watch,
World Movement for
Democracy, Transparency
International, Amnesty
International, EarthAction,
etc. Zapatistas in Mexico
and protests of G-8, World
Trade Organization, World
Bank, and other global
tf\stttuttQf\S as wen as the
war in Iraq, transnational
corporations, etc.
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EndNotes
1 With extensive advice, feedback, and support from Franck Amalric, drawing on his
lished working paper, and other members of the Great Transition Initiative working group.
e borrow the concept of a Global Citizen's Movement from Raskin et aI., (2002)
Latency in this context refers to the potential emergence ofa new identity as people come to view
lves as part of a single global community united in human solidarity (See Raskin et al., 2002).
Civil society refers broadly to voluntary activity that is not strictly familial, governmental, or
mic. As individuals, we are all members of civil society, participating in sports leagues, church
)book clubs, or any organized activity with our neighbors. Civil society includes civic action by
. uals, associations, foundations, faith-based groups) and nonprofit organizations, and has been
n a global level for centuries (initially in the form of missionary work) (Melucci, 1993).
hile the rise of NGOs indicates a potentially profound shift in public engagement, we
acknowledge that some NGOs are vehicles for corporate or special interests with little or
roots. Others are linked to fundamentalist groups or reactionary forces, corresponding
ents of the public threatened by the rapid pace of global change. Still, many others are
in the struggles for peace, justice, development, and environmental health. Smith (1998)
at Transnational Social Movement Organizations (TSMOs) contribute to the formation
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of social capital, even though these organizations do not generate routine, face- to- face contact
among melnbers. TSMOs provide an infrastructure that facilitates transnational comInunication
and action, by cultivating transnational identities, and by developing a global public discourse.
6 The chart in appendix 1 offers an overview of civil society activity focusing on those efforts
to create a just and sustainable world rooted in delnocratic principles.
7 In our view, globalization arises out of a centuries-long process that accelerated dralnatically
over the last fifty years (Scholte, 2000) and is qualitatively different from previous epochs of world
capitalism (Robinson, 2004).
8 The Civil Rights movelnent provides an example of this change of consciousness when
Inainstream America's public opinion was galvanized from television news' depiction of the sheer
violence -the beatings, fire hose blasts, and taunts - endured by the peaceful African American
protestors on the streets (Berman & Murphy).
\) ~ee Harcour\, e\ at \'2\)\)6) \01 11l01e ue\a\\s on womens ~\'dt.e-\)'d~ed\l\\\\'d\\~e~.
lOLa Via Calnpesina is an international movement of peasants, landless, rural women, slnalland InediuIn-sized producers indigenous people, agricultural workers, and rural youth. http://www.
viacalnpesina.org/main_en/index.php?option=coIn_content&task=blogcategory&id=27&Itelnid=44
11 Our understanding of Global Citizenship resonates with Oxfam's, and would include of
necessity:
• awareness of the wider world and a sense of one's role as a world citizen;
• valuing diversity;
• sOlne understanding of how the world works economically, politically, socially, culturally,
technologically and environlnentally;
• outrage at social injustice;
• participation in and contribution to the community at a range of levels froln local to
global;
• willingness to act to make the world a more sustainable place;
• taking responsibility for their actions.
h Up://www.oxfam.org.uk/coolplanet!teachers/globciti/whatis.htm
12 Calling for «a different form of globalization, involving global citizenship rights" (della
Porta, 2005), activists prefer terms like global justice, new-global, or words with no exact English
translation, such as altermondialiste, or Globalisierungskritiker. Other examples of this include
the «Global Delnocracy Movement" and «Global Solidarity Movement" (Milstein, 2001), and the
«Progressive Movement" (Berg, 2003).Since there is not an agreed upon name for this contemporary
movelnent phenomena, we will give it «Global Justice Movement" here.
13 Confusingly labeled by mass media as the «anti-globalization movelnent;' most activists
reject this tenn as an inaccurate characterization of diverse social movements which value crosscultural exchanges, and even supranational governmental structures.
14 The World Economic Forum is an exclusive gathering of political and corporate elites,
which takes place every January in the resort town of Davos, Switzerland.
15 Personal cOInmunication with members ofthe International Committee of the WSF (2005, 2(06).
16 Although events are still unfolding, the socialist governments' disregard for indigenous
cOInInunity concerns in Venezuela are perhaps good illustrations of this point.
17 His argulnent that power must be contested in the cultural realm, ironically, has resonated
strongly with the neo-conservatives and those active in the resurgence of the political right in the
US (Epstein, 1991). Interestingly, SOlne of the Inost prominent neo-conservative intellectuals had
been active in the New Left during the 1960s, where Gramsci's ideas had a large influence.
18 Efforts such as the Apollo Alliance, which seeks to link labor, business, social justice, and
environmental concerns by focusing on the agenda of energy independence, fall into this trap.
19 «The PrinCiple of Constrained PluralisIn" (paraphrased from Raskin, 2006b)
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The basis for unity amidst diversity is found in the principle of Constrained Pluralism, which
olves the competing imperatives of global responsibility and regional autonomy; and includes
ree complelnentary ideas: irreducibility, subsidiary, and heterogeneity. Irreducibility means that
rtain issues are properly resolved at the global level ofgovernance. A global society needs to ensure
iversal rights, the integrity of the biosphere, and the fair use of common planetary resources.
idiary sharply limits the scope of irreducible global authority. To promote effectiveness,
parency, and public participation, decision-making should be guided to the most local
ible level. Heterogeneity validates the rights of regions to pursue diverse forms of development
trained only by their obligations to confonn to global responsibilities and principles.
e constraints do not resolve all gray areas. They leave open much room for contention and
rpretation. Politics and debates would continue within a Global Citizens Movelnent. See www.
Initiative.org for further discussion.

